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policy to which development could bring substantial improvements and, consequently, it
merits more attention than it has traditionally
received.
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FEATURE COMMENT: Considering
The Effects Of Public Procurement
Regulations On Competitive Markets
Professor Albert Sanchez Graells of the University
of Hull (UK) recently published a vitally important
book on procurement law, Public Procurement and
the EU Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 2011).
In his carefully researched study, Sanchez Graells
asked what seems like a simple question: Shouldn’t
regulators, when writing procurement regulations,
consider the likely impact of those regulations on
competitive markets? Sanchez Graells, who will be
addressing this point at an upcoming George Washington University Law School symposium, pointed
out that far too little attention has been paid to
the anticompetitive impact of public procurement
regulation:
[T]his significant area of overlap between
competition and public procurement law (ie,
the competition distortions that public procurement regulations and administrative practices
can produce themselves) still remains unexplored. Generally, publicly-created distortions
of competition in the field of public procurement have not yet been effectively tackled
by either competition or public procurement
law—probably because of the major political
and governance implications embedded in or
surrounding public procurement activities,
which make development and enforcement of
competition law and policy in this area an even
more complicated issue, and sometimes muddy
the analysis and normative recommendations.
Notwithstanding these relevant difficulties, ...
this is a very relevant area of competition
4-135-089-4		

Id. at 9.
This F eature C omment assesses Sanchez
Graells’ thesis from a U.S. perspective. As the
discussion below explains, in many ways the U.S.
federal procurement system stands at one end of
a spectrum. Even when the question was squarely
before regulators—when they were assessing how
procurement rules should be shaped to take advantage of commercial efficiencies—regulators apparently never seriously considered the collateral
impact of their rules on those same markets.
Regulators in the U.S. federal system instead
typically focus on best value, i.e., on how to shape
procurement rules to maximize competition within
a procurement itself, to gain the best value for the
public money spent. See, e.g., FAR 1.102(a), 48 CFR
§ 1.102(a) (“The vision for the Federal Acquisition
System is to deliver on a timely basis the best value
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy
objectives.”). As the discussion below explains,
although there is clear legal authority calling for a
prospective analysis of procurement rules’ costs and
benefits to the competitive marketplace, U.S. policymakers often fail to assess the competitive impact
that procurement regulations are likely to have.
At the other end of the spectrum, European regulators often place first emphasis on procurement
regulations’ impact on the market—sometimes to
the detriment of best value. As the University of
Nottingham’s Professor Sue Arrowsmith recently
argued, while the EU’s procurement directives set
minimum requirements for all the European member states’ procurement laws, European policymakers’ central goal in framing those directives was to
integrate the European internal market—not to
maximize best value in procurement.

© 2013 Thomson Reuters

[T]he directives are concerned primarily to
promote the internal market, as indicated by
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their legal base, and ... they do this by performing three functions: prohibiting discrimination,
securing transparency to allow monitoring and
enforcement of the non-discrimination rule, and
removing barriers to market access.
*
*
*
Finally, and importantly, we rejected the notion
that the directives seek value for money [best
value] for Member States, either in a narrow
sense of reliably securing what is needed on the
best terms, or in a wider sense that embraces the
decision on what to buy.

Arrowsmith, “The Purpose of the EU Procurement
Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal Procurement Policies,” at 46–47, in The Cambridge
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2011–2012, Vol.
14 (Barnard, Gehring and Solanke, eds., Hart Publishing 2013).
The discussion below, following Sanchez Graells’
lead, suggests a middle course. Rather than making
economic integration the focus of procurement regulation (the approach that Arrowsmith attributes to
the EU procurement directives), the discussion below
suggests that those drafting federal procurement
rules in the U.S. should consider the impact of those
rules on the broader competitive market, and should
mold those rules, if appropriate, to minimize adverse
competitive impacts. This would not mean that the
procurement rules exist primarily to integrate the
broader commercial market (the European focus), but
rather would mean that the U.S. procurement system
governed by those rules would, to the extent possible,
integrate efficiently with that commercial market.
Why Regulators Should Assess Procurement
Rules’ Impacts on the Broader Market—There is
a substantial body of literature, both nationally and
internationally, which confirms that procurement
rules can have significant anticompetitive effects, both
inside and outside the procurement market. See, e.g.,
Anderson, Kovacic and Müller, “Ensuring Integrity and
Competition in Public Procurement Markets: A Dual
Challenge for Good Governance,” in The WTO Regime
on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform
681 (Arrowsmith and Anderson, eds., World Trade Organization 2011); Anderson and Müller, “Competition
Policy and Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach,”
at 12 (WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02, Feb.
20, 2013), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2223977;
Yukins, “A Case Study in Comparative Procurement
2
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Law: Assessing UNCITRAL’s Lessons for U.S. Procurement,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 457, 462–63 (2006) (assessing
anticompetitive impact of electronic procurement regulations); Nensala, “Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 12: How HSPD-12 May Limit Competition
Unnecessarily and Suggestions for Reform,” 40 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 619 (2010) (impact of security regulation on
competition); Haberbush, “Limiting the Government’s
Exposure to Bid Rigging Schemes: A Critical Look at
the Sealed Bidding Regime,” 30 Pub. Cont. L.J. 97, 103
(2000) (sealed bidding, as required by Government,
itself facilitates bidder collusion); Malhotra, “Study on
Government Procurement: Study for Evidence-Based
Competition Advocacy” (January 2012) (case studies
of how Indian procurement rules have anticompetitive impact), available at sps.iitd.ac.in/PDF/SGP.
pdf; UK Office of Fair Trading, “Assessing the Impact
of Public Sector Procurement on Competition” (2004)
(privately prepared report), available at www.oft.gov.
uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft742b.pdf. But
cf. Thaggert, “Antitrust and Public Procurement—The
United States,” 7 Comp. L. Int’l 82, 84 (2011) (describing U.S. federal procurement disclosure rules which are
intended to stem anticompetitive conduct by bidders).
As studies have emphasized, procurement rules
can have—or mask—significant anticompetitive behavior. See, e.g., Cushman, “The ABA Model Procurement Code: Implementation, Evolution, and Crisis
of Survival,” 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 173, 193–94 (1996)
(“procedural compliance with [procurement] rules can
actually mask improper conduct rather than prevent[]
it; compliance with form disguises anticompetitive or
worse activities”). These anticompetitive impacts may
include the following.
Raising Barriers to Entry: Rigid rules governing competition in procurement can, in effect, lock
prospective bidders out of a procurement market.
See, e.g., Kennedy-Loest, Thomas and Farley, “EU
Public Procurement and Competition Law: The Yin
and Yang of the Legal World?,” 7 Comp. L. Int’l 77, 80
(2011) (closely limited awards in Northern Ireland of
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (framework)
agreements locked out potential competitors). These
barriers can, in turn, cripple those firms that otherwise would have competed in related commercial
markets, if they had used public contracts to leverage
their market positions.
Collusion among Bidders: Because of the nature
of the Government’s highly structured bidding process, that process may, in practice, facilitate collusion
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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among bidders. See, e.g., Haberbush, supra, at 103;
Albano and Spagnolo, “Asymmetry and Collusion in
Sequential Procurement: A ‘Large Lot Last’ Policy,”
10 B.E. J. Theoretical Econs., Art. 43 (2010); Ishii,
“Favor Exchange in Collusion: Empirical Study of
Repeated Procurement Auctions in Japan,” 27 Int’l J.
Indus. Org. 137 (2009). Some observers believe that
this can, in turn, have spillover effects in the private
marketplace, as public bidders leverage collusion in
public markets for gains in commercial markets. Cf.
DeSanti and Nagata, “Competitor Communications:
Facilitating Practices or Invitations to Collude? An
Application of Theories of Proposed Horizontal Agreements Submitted for Antitrust Review,” 63 Antitrust
L.J. 93 (U.S. Federal Trade Commission alleged that
manufacturers used public procurement auctions for
competitor communications).
Artificially Buoying Price: Government pricing
policies in procurement also may have a collateral effect in the commercial market. The General Services
Administration, for example, insists that contractors
on its Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts
commit to pass any commercial discounts on to the
contractors’ Government customers as well. The MAS
most-favored customer provision, known as the Price
Reductions clause, means, in practice, that vendors,
competing in a market where all competitors face
collateral price impacts for lowering their commercial
prices, may decline to decrease their prices, public or
commercial. See, e.g., Woodward, “The Perverse Effect
of the Multiple Award Schedules’ Price Reductions
Clause,” 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 527, 544–49 (2012). A price
effect of this type is in keeping with the economic
literature, which warns that most-favored customer
provisions can artificially buoy prices in the commercial marketplace by discouraging price discounting.
See, e.g., Cooper, “Most-Favored-Customer Pricing
and Tacit Collusion,” 17 Rand J. Econs. 377 (1986).
There is, therefore, little doubt that procurement
rules can have significant competitive impacts in
the commercial marketplace—and, indeed, there is
substantial agreement on the types of impacts those
rules may have. The question, then, is whether U.S.
regulators have considered those potential effects
when framing new procurement rules.
The Commercial-Item Revolution: A Lost
Opportunity to Consider Market Impact—One
obvious opportunity for regulators to have considered the market impact of procurement rules was
when the Government changed its rules to facilitate
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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commercial buying by the Government. Regulators
were reshaping the procurement rules to bring federal purchasers of commercial items into the private
marketplace; it would have been a logical extension of
those reforms to consider those revised rules’ impact
on that private marketplace. To this day, it remains a
puzzle why U.S. regulators apparently never considered the market impacts of the new commercial-item
purchasing rules.
In the 1990s, the U.S. Government substantially
reshaped its procurement rules regarding the purchase of commercial goods and services—“commercial
items,” as they are known in the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. FAR 2.101 and pt. 12, 48 CFR § 2.101
and pt. 12. See generally O’Sullivan and Perry, “Commercial Item Acquisitions,” 97-05 Briefing Papers 1
(April 1997).
In retrospect, one striking aspect of the commercial-item revolution was that in developing the new
rules, the Government never undertook—nor apparently even considered—a formal analysis to determine
the new rules’ market impact. That economic-impact
analysis probably would have been part of a costbenefit assessment, and cost-benefit analysis was
already an established aspect of U.S. rulemaking. See
EO 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981), available
at www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/
executive-order/12291.html; see also EO 12866, 58
Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866.pdf. See generally title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 (2 USCA §§ 1532–1538) (calling for an assessment of economic impact).
Moreover, a number of published studies had
already warned that public procurement rules could
cause significant distortions in commercial markets.
See, e.g., Sanchez Graells, supra, at 11, 56–57 (citing
Kettl, “Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets,” at 31 (1993); ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Antitrust Law Developments, at 1107–09 (3d ed.
1992); Note, “Gains from a Unified European Community Public Procurement Market: An Analysis Using
Auction Theory,” 1990 Brigham Young University Law
Review 1727, 1729 (1990); Carroll and Scott, “The
Modification of Industry Performance through the
Use of Government Monopsony Power,” 3 Indus. Org.
Rev. 28 (1975); Round, “The Impact of Government
Purchases on Market Performance in Australia,” 1
Rev. Indus. Org. 94 (1984)). Finally, the federal public
procurement system was already an economic behe3
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moth by the time of the commercial-item reforms—by
fiscal year 1988, federal procurement had reached
$200 billion annually. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy, “Federal Procurement Data System:
Standard Report, Fiscal Year 1988 through Fourth
Quarter (October 1, 1987 through September 30,
1988),” at 2, available at www.fpds.gov/downloads/
FPR_Reports/Fiscal%20Year%201981%20-%202002/
FEDPROCREPORT_FY1988-4Q.pdf.
As a result, an objective observer likely would
have concluded that the commercial-item reforms
would have a material impact on the broader competitive economy because the reforms would allow the
Government to play a much larger role, as a buyer, in
the commercial markets. These new public procurement regulations, specifically intended to increase
the Government’s presence in the broader commercial market, with attendant costs and benefits, were
therefore precisely the type of rulemaking that should
have triggered an analysis of the rules’ likely impact
on the competitive markets. Cf. Shapiro and Brainard,
“Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast
Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands
More Than a Name Change,” 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L.
Rev. 1, 30 and n. 166 (2003) (proposed U.S. legislation,
intended to reduce market barriers to entry, would
have required that international trade agreements
regarding procurement call for cost-benefit analyses
of proposed procurement rules).
The administrative record, however, indicates
that the drafters of the new policies never considered
such a cost-benefit analysis. Cf. 60 Fed. Reg. 48231
(Sept. 18, 1995) (although commercial-item rulemaking was, by its terms, subject to Office of Management
and Budget review under EO 12866, notice accompanying sweeping new FAR pt. 12 (commercial-item)
rules made no reference to cost-benefit analysis or
to the impact of new commercial-item rules on competitive markets); see also Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, OIRA historical reports search
webpage, available at www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoHistReviewSearch, under “Agency” pull-down menu
select “Department of Defense,” and under “Calendar
Year” select “1995” (RIN 0750-AB00, the OIRA report
number for the DOD changes to commercial-item
acquisition based on FASA, indicates that DOD classified the revolutionary commercial-items regulatory
changes as “not economically significant”; a costbenefit analysis is only required for economically
significant regulatory changes, see infra pg. 7). The
4
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two key (and comprehensive) reports that established
the foundation for the commercial-item reforms were
the 1986 “Packard Commission” report and the 1993
“Section 800 Panel” report. See “Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress” 39–41
(January 2007) (discussing history). In both of those
reports, however, the reformers’ central goal was to
lower prices for public procurements; the answer, in
both instances, was to rely more heavily on the commercial market.
One of the primary findings of the Packard Commission, for example, was that then-current public
procurement regulations allowed agencies to require
Government-unique specifications for Government
products, “despite the commercial availability of adequate alternative items costing much less” (emphasis
added). See President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, “A Quest For Excellence: Final
Report to the President,” at 44, 60 (June 1986), available at www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/36ex2.pdf. The
Packard Commission therefore recommended that
“[r]ather than relying on excessively rigid military
specifications, [the Department of Defense] should
make much greater use of components, systems, and
services available [commercially] ‘off the shelf.’ ” Id.
at xxv.
Similarly, the Section 800 Panel identified DOD’s
primary acquisition threat as a “continued reliance
by DOD on defense-unique products [that] can only
mean higher costs and loss of industrial base for DoD”
(emphasis added). See DOD Acquisition Law Advisory
Panel, “Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws: Executive Summary,” at 12 (March 1993), available at
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA264919.
The perspective thus was one-sided: reformers considered only what the commercial market could do
for the Government’s public procurement, and the
reports never seemed to consider what the revamped
public procurement regulations would do to the competitive commercial markets.
Rulemaking Should Consider Costs and
Benefits, Including Market Impacts—Twenty
years later, the commercial-item revolution appears
to be receding in the face of new statutes and regulations that have reversed many of its initial gains.
See, e.g., Acquisition Reform Working Group, “2012
Legislative Recommendations,” at 12 (April 2012),
available at www.ndia.org/advocacy/resources/
pages/arWG.aspx. Should the regulatory pendulum
© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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swing towards liberalized commercial-item procurement again, however, regulators should first consider
the impact of those revised rules on the commercial
markets.
The analysis of empirical data of that kind will
allow public procurement policymakers to weigh the
prospective economic costs of different approaches,
which will in turn help guide public procurement
rulemaking that has net positive impacts on the
economy. The specific processes used to incorporate
cost-benefit analysis will depend on the particular
regulation being considered. Here, we consider how,
within the analytical framework contemplated by
law, the Government would incorporate cost-benefit
analyses into its public procurement rulemaking
processes.
The primary procedural requirements for U.S.
rulemaking are established by the Administrative
Procedures Act. See 5 USCA §§ 551–559. The APA
establishes requirements for five types of rulemaking processes: formal, informal, hybrid, direct final
and negotiated rulemaking. Id. §§ 552–557; see also
Burrows and Garvey, Congressional Research Service, “A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial
Review,” CRS Report No. R41546, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2011).
The informal notice-and-comment rulemaking contemplated by the APA is the most common form of
rulemaking in executive agencies, and is the type of
rulemaking normally used for public procurement
rules under the FAR. See Manuel et al., CRS, “The
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Answers to
Frequently Asked Questions,” CRS Rep. No. R42826,
at 11 (Nov. 16, 2012).
It has been noted, however, that rulemaking under the FAR is not, strictly speaking, governed by the
APA. See U.S. v. AEY, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Fla.
2009). The APA, by its terms, exempts Government
procurement contracts from its notice-and-comment
requirements. See 5 USCA § 553(a). Instead, rulemaking under the FAR is governed by the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act, 41 USCA § 1301 et seq., and
the FAR includes its own notice-and-comment provision at FAR 1.501, 48 CFR § 1.501. See AEY, 603 F.
Supp. at 1374.
In federal rulemaking, the most extensive requirements for cost-benefit analysis—which would,
presumably, be the rubric under which procurement
regulations’ market impact would be assessed—have
come through executive orders and guidance. See, e.g.,
Copeland, CRS, “Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Re© 2013 Thomson Reuters
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quirements in the Rulemaking Process,” CRS Report
No. R41974, at 3, 11 (Aug. 11, 2011), available at www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf.
EO 12866, issued by President Clinton on Sept.
30, 1993, remains in effect for executive agency costbenefit analysis requirements. 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
(1993). President Obama reaffirmed “the principles,
structures, and definitions governing contemporary
regulatory review that were established in Executive
Order 12866 of September 30, 1993.” See EO 13563,
76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
eo12866/eo13563_01182011.pdf. EO 12866 applies
to cabinet-level agencies and independent agencies, but not to independent regulatory agencies. Id.
§ 3(b). Notably, § 3(d) of the order, which defines the
“regulations” or “rules” covered by the order, exempts
regulations that pertain to military functions, “other
than procurement regulations” (emphasis added).
This “double-negative”—an exception to an exemption—thus seems to bring the FAR’s procurement
regulations squarely within EO 12866 and its requirement for a regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
Section 3(f) of the executive order defines economically significant rules as agency regulations
that may “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy
of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a
material way the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment,
public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities” (emphasis added). Id.
§ 3(f)(1). Section 6(a)(3)(C) of the executive order then
requires agencies proposing economically significant rules to incorporate into their decision-making
process a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed rule,
and an assessment of reasonable alternatives to the
proposed rule.
In September 2003, OMB issued Circular A-4,
which standardized “the way benefits and costs
of Federal regulatory actions are measured and
reported.” See OMB, “Circular A-4—Subject: Regulatory Analysis,” at 1 (Sept. 17, 2003), available
at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf; see also
OIRA, “Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer,”
at 2–3, available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_
regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. It also requires an agency to provide its proposed rule’s costbenefit analysis, called a regulatory impact analysis,
5
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to OIRA for review. See OMB, “Circular A-4—Subject:
Regulatory Analysis,” at 48.
The impacts that economically significant procurement rules have on competitive commercial
markets are, it seems, precisely the types of impacts
contemplated by EO 12866 and OMB Circular A-4—
the impacts which should be assessed during the
rulemaking process, as part of a broader cost-benefit
analysis. The “commercial market” is part of the
“economy,” and certainly a “sector of the economy”
under the executive order, and many proposed public
procurement rules will easily reach the $100 million
threshold, since the size of the annual federal public
procurement market currently exceeds $500 billion.
A proposed rule governing commercial items,
which touched only 1/50th of one percent of the $500
billion federal procurement budget, for example,
would still reach the $100 million threshold for economically significant rules, subject to the executive
order. And even if that monetary threshold is not met,
the executive order arguably reaches, in the alternative, procurement rules which will materially affect
competition in the economy—which is precisely the
adverse economic impact warned of by so many economic studies, such as those previously cited.
Were the U.S. to adopt this approach, and weigh
in advance the adverse competitive effects of procurement rules, the Government could avoid rules with
substantial net negative impacts on the economy. The
Government would, moreover, be acting in accord with
international best practices. Although every country
has slightly different rulemaking processes, costbenefit analysis is being embraced internationally
where, as here, a rule is likely to have a material competitive impact. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, “Recommendation of
the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance”
(March 12, 2012) (calling for prospective assessment
of competitive impacts).

6
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Conclusion—As the discussion above reflects, a
substantial body of literature confirms that procurement rules can have a significant negative impact on
competitive commercial markets. Procurement rules
can, for example, raise new barriers to entry in the
commercial marketplace, facilitate collusion in the
commercial space, or artificially buoy commercial
prices. Federal procurement regulators have not, as
a regular matter, assessed those possible impacts
in past rulemaking, but sound practice and legal
authority, including an executive order, seem to call
for such assessments. Assessing procurement rules’
likely impact on competitive markets would be in
accord with best practices in rulemaking, and would
help ensure that the federal procurement system
integrates efficiently, and not disruptively, into the
broader economy.

F
This Feature Comment was written for The Government Contractor by Christopher R. Yukins
and Lieutenant Colonel Jose A. Cora. Chris
Yukins is a Professor of Government Contract
Law and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program at the George Washington University Law School. Jose Cora is a Judge
Advocate in the U.S. Army, was an Associate
Professor of Contract and Fiscal Law at the
U.S. Army JAG School from 2007–2010, and is
currently a 2013 George Washington University
LL.M. Candidate in Government Procurement
Law. Further information on the GWU Law
School March 12 and 14, 2013 symposium on
competition and procurement law is available
at www.law.gwu.edu/News/2012-2013Events/
Pages/CompetitionProcurementSymposium.
aspx. Several of the authors cited in this article,
including Albert Sanchez Graells, Gian Luigi
Albano, William Kovacic and Robert Anderson,
will be speaking at that symposium on March 14.
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